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¶1

¶2

¶3
¶4

¶5

¶6

In a move that is sure to send waves rippling through the legal arena, the Second
Circuit overruled one of its district courts in the case of Cartoon Network LP v. CSC
Holdings, Inc. 1 (Cablevision II) that governs the application of the Copyright Act in
today’s new era of digital technology.
In Cablevision II, the court evaluated the legal viability of a Remote Service–
Digital Video Recorder (RS-DVR) device that was prospectively to be released by the
Cablevision company in 2006. This new RS-DVR provided customers the ability to
record various television programming, like a normal DVR, but instead of using the
device to store the program, the storage of the programs would be housed by servers at
Cablevision offices. Numerous television networks, such as Twentieth Century Fox and
Cartoon Networks, brought suit against Cablevision to prohibit the unveiling of this new
technology. The suit maintained that the process of the RS-DVR made illegal copies of
the programming as prohibited under the Copyright Act, and Cablevision—not the
consumer—was responsible for the illegal copies since the storage of the programming
was being provided by Cablevision servers. The networks also alleged that the RS-DVR
infringed upon the network’s right to “perform the[ir] copyrighted work publicly” under
§ 106 of the Copyright Act. 2 The networks threatened Cablevision with an injunction to
prohibit Cablevision’s rollout of the service unless Cablevision purchased licenses from
the networks for the shows to be recorded and played.
Part I of this paper will provide a detailed backdrop of the current state of the law
concerning the Copyright Act and the presiding case on the topic.
Part II of this paper will describe the process used by the Cablevision RS-DVR and
how it allows the consumer to record television programs. Part II will also describe how
the RS-DVR differs from the VCR, the current DVR, and other technologies.
Part III will detail the analysis that the District Court used in reaching its
conclusion that the RS-DVR is more like a service than a device, the RS-DVR makes
illegal copies of copyrighted programming, and the playback of the programming
infringes on the rights of television networks to show their material publicly.
Part IV will provide various stances on the outcome of the District Court’s
decision. Part V will also show how the Court of Appeals chose a different stance on this

∗

Candidate for Juris Doctor, Northwestern University School of Law 2010. I would like to dedicate this
article to my parents, Karl and Ruth Riley, for their unswerving support of all of my endeavors.
1
536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008).
2
17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2006).
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issue and analyze how its stance deviates from the presiding precedent that holds when
something is copied to a computer’s random access memory, a copy is made.
In Part VI, I will hypothesize what the Supreme Court will decide on this issue as
to whether the RS-DVR violates the Copyright Act of 1976 should the Court grant
certiori.
I. THE PAST BECOMES OBSOLETE

¶8

The seminal case that has provided the background for this case is MAI Systems
Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc. 3
A. MAI v. Peak

¶9

In MAI, MAI Systems designed software to operate its computers, and Peak
Computer, Inc. maintained MAI computers for various clients of MAI. 4 Peak’s service of
the computers included diagnosing routine problems and conducting necessary repairs
using MAI’s programs. In order to diagnose the computer problems while servicing a
MAI computer, a Peak Technician would have to operate (turn on) the computer and
utilize an unauthorized copy of MAI’s operating system (OS) software which was
originally licensed to Peak’s customers. 5 As MAI asserted that running programs that are
licensed to another amounted to copyright infringement (unauthorized use), MAI applied
for an injunction to prohibit Peak from running MAI software licensed to Peak
customers, using unlicensed software at its headquarters, and loaning MAI computers and
software to its customers. 6
¶10
The MAI court was confronted with the question: how do we ascertain whether a
copy has been made? The court found that a claim of copyright infringement will prevail
if a “‘copying’ of a protectable expression” goes beyond the scope of a license. 7 The
Copyright Act defines “copies” as, “material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a
work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which the work
can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid
of a machine or device.” 8 The Copyright Act then explains, “a work is ‘fixed’ in a
tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or
under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory
duration.” 9
¶11
MAI’s software license allowed only MAI customers to run its software; the
license did not allow third parties, such as Peak, to use this software unless it was directly
licensed to them. 10 When Peak ran the required maintenance on its customer’s
3

991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 513.
5
Id.
6
Id. at 517. The pertinent charge for the current analysis is the unauthorized use and copying of MAI’s
software.
7
Id.
8
17 U.S.C. § 101.
9
Id.
10
MAI, 991 F.2d at 517.
4

324

Vol. 8:2]

Karl O. Riley

computers, the technician used MAI’s software to diagnose the problem. This
intrinsically meant that MAI’s software would be loaded onto the customer’s computer’s
random access memory (RAM). Although Peak claimed that this copy created in RAM
was not “fixed”, the court found that the representation made in the RAM is “sufficiently
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated
for a period of more than transitory duration;” 11 therefore, Peak’s use of the software
ventured beyond the scope of the software license and violated the Copyright Act. 12
II. THE WAVE OF THE FUTURE –THE NEW DVR
¶12

Before the suit, Cablevision prospectively sought to offer the RS-DVR as part of
Cablevision’s cable service. In order to give a full operative view of the technology
utilized by the RS-DVR, I will first need to describe the technology used to deliver cable
television to Cablevision customers.
A. Cable
1. Television and Cable Generally

¶13

Television is the simultaneous transmission of video and audio signals. 13 As
opposed to sending television waves in analog form that are received by an antenna,
“Cable” television is transmitted in digital form via a coaxial cable that is connected to a
television set via a “set-top box.” 14 A digital television can directly receive digital signals
whereas an analog television cannot unless the television is connected to a set top box
which converts the digital signal to an analog signal. 15
2. Delivery to Customers

¶14

Digital signals are transmitted from its source to the television in a compressed data
form known as binary digits, or “bits.” 16 Because of its compressed form, more signals
can occupy the same space; therefore, the consumer has access to greater programming
choices than with the analog signal. Digital signals also provide a better audio and video
feed for the customer. 17
¶15
Cable’s programming begins with the network companies sending their television
content (television programming) to the cable company’s “head end” facility. 18 A head

11

Id. at 519.
Id. at 517.
13
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp. (Cablevision I), 478 F. Supp. 2d 607,
610 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
14
Id.
15
Wikipedia, Set-top box, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Set-top_box (last visited Mar. 25, 2010).
(“Special digital set-top boxes are available for receiving digital television broadcasts on TV sets that do
not have a built in digital tuner.”).
16
Cablevision I, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 610.
17
Id.
18
Id.
12
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end facility is a central facility that harbors much of the hardware and software that is
needed to operate the cable company’s system as a whole. 19
¶16
The cable company collects the feeds in single stream called an “aggregated
programming stream” (APS). 20 The APS is comprised of packets of data that are noted
with a “program identifier” (PID) that denotes which network or program to which it
belongs. 21 The APS is sent from the cable company’s head end to its customers via a
process called “Quadrature Amplitude Modulation” (QAM) by way of devices called
QAM modulators. 22 The QAM converts the networks digital feed into radio frequency
(RF) signals for easier transmission along the coaxial cable. 23 These RF signals are sent
to the vast networks of smaller cable systems that are comprised of the cable company’s
homes. 24 The smaller cable systems or nodes are operated by a specific QAM modulator
that transmits the RF signal to the customer’s set-top box.25
¶17
The packets of the APS stream are then filtered and reassembled into a signal
stream to be decrypted, decoded, and displayed. 26 Cable companies are able to regulate
access to certain programming by encrypting certain packets in the APS, and the set-top
box decrypts the packets in order to reveal the programming.
B. Old-School Recording
1. Video Cassette Recorder (VCR)
¶18

The first VCR, the Sony Betamax, was released in the 1970s. 27 The device adapted
the television signals and recorded them onto the magnetic tape within the video cassette
for later playback at the customer’s discretion. 28 This format was a dominant form of
recording television programming until DVDs exploded on scene in the early 2000s. 29
2. Set-Top Storage DVRs (STS-DVR)

¶19

STS-DVRs can operate as a DVR and set top cable box; however, the STS-DVR
can record the digital television programming directly without decoding the APS
stream. 30 The STS-DVR records the programming onto the internal hard drive housed in
the DVR. The device also may have two tuners that allow the customer to watch one
television program while recording another program simultaneously, or record two
channels at the same time. 31
19

Id.
Id. at 610.
21
Id. at 610–11.
22
Id. at 611.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Wikipedia, Videocassette Recorder,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Videocassette_recorder#Early_machines_and_formats (last visited Mar. 25,
2010).
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Cablevision I, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 611–12.
31
Id. at 612.
20
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Once the programming has been recorded, it is ready for playback. The customer
can control the playback (i.e. pause, fast-forward, etc.) through different “trick modes.” 32
The length of recordable space is limited by the size of the hard drive. The customer can
only record programs for which the customer has paid; the STS-DVR does not allow the
customer to record pay-per-view or Video-on-Demand programming. 33
C. RS-DVR Technology
1. Generally

¶21

Cablevision’s RS-DVR differs from the STS-DVR in one main way. It continues
to record television programming for the customer, but the recorded programming is not
saved to a hard drive within the DVR itself; the recorded programming is stored remotely
on computer servers stationed at the cable company’s head ends. 34 These servers are
made up of multiple hard disks where every customer that subscribes to the service will
be given a specific amount of storage space. Only that customer can access his own
respective storage space. 35 The program would be stored indefinitely on the server until
it is deleted by the customer or if it is overwritten by the customer on a “first in-first out”
schedule. 36
2. The RS-DVR technology

¶22

Since the RS-DVR does not record the program on-site (at the place of the box), a
summary of the technology that is used to record the television programming is
necessary.
¶23
The BarcoNet is a closed circuit network that transmits the APS for distribution for
the cable company. 37 Instead of allowing the APS to flow from the BarcoNet to the
QAM Modulators, the APS is split in two streams: one to the QAM modulator for
distribution to the customers without the RS-DVR and the other to different device called
the “Big Band Broadband Multimedia Router” (BMR).
¶24
Through a process called clamping, the BMR converts the RF signals to a stream
that is even more efficient. 38 During this process, the stream is placed in the BMR’s
“buffer” memory. 39 Buffers are regions of memory that temporarily hold data. These
buffers hold information as it moves to its destination. The BMR also splits the stream
into User Datagram Protocol (UDP) packets. These packets are assigned a port number
that identifies the respective television channel to which they belong. 40
¶25
This stream is then fed to the cable company’s servers that are at its head end.
Each server can service up to ninety-six cable customers. The servers then store the
streams into its “primary ingest buffer”. Each packet of programming is stored in the
32

Id.
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 613.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 614.
33
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buffer for up to a tenth of a second. The primary ingest buffer can hold enough packets
that amount up to 3 frames of video from any of the channels carried by Cablevision. 41
The buffering takes place automatically, so if a customer requests a specific program, the
respective packets can be found and recorded to the customer’s hard drive space. 42
a) How the RS-DVR records.—The customer may record a program through two
different ways. The customer may scroll through the on screen program and set a timer
by pressing record on the remote control, or the customer may press record while
watching the program. Once the customer has chosen the program, the remote sends a
signal to the “Application Data Server” (ADS) to verify the following five components
are available: (1) the program is within the customer’s cable subscription package, (2) the
program has not been previously requested by the customer, (3) the customer has
sufficient space on the hard drive for the program to be recorded, (4) the request will not
result in two programs being recorded at the same time, and (5) the customer is
authorized to receive the program in question. 43 If any of these components are not met,
an error message will display and ask the customer to take various steps to remedy the
situation.
Once the above components have been satisfied, the ADS alerts the “Oracle
Production Server” (OPRD) which maintains a list of programs that have been requested
for recording. 44 If the program has been previously requested by another customer, the
OPRD will send an “asset ID,” which denotes the respective program, to the ADS; if the
program has not been requested, the OPRD will generate a new asset ID. 45 This ID is
added to the OPRD’s list of programs. 46 The ADS then communicates with the “Vitria”
server, which is the only server to communicate with the Arroyo server. 47
When it is time to record, the Vitria server sends a list of all the program requests
to the Arroyo server which is holding the packets of that program in its buffer memory. 48
The Arroyo server then searches for the respective packets of that program in the primary
ingest buffer, and when found, it sends these packets to a secondary ingest buffer. The
copy is made in this second buffer and sent to the hard drive of each requesting customer.
The customer is then notified by the Arroyo server that the copy was made and is ready
for playback. 49 If no request for the program is made by the customer, then no copy is
made by the Arroyo server.
b) Playback.—When the customer is ready to view the program, the customer
selects the program from the on-screen menu. This alerts the Arroyo server to begin
interacting with the “Enterprise Session Resource Manager” (eSRM), which manages the
playback process. The eSRM streams the program through the QAM to the set-top box.
The Arroyo server locates the recorded program, and sends the stream to the customer’s
QAM. The stream is then transmitted to every node that the QAM services, but only the

41

Id.
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 615.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id. The Arroyo server is where the program is stored until deleted by the customer.
48
Id. at 615.
49
Id.
42
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requesting set-top box is provided with the key for decrypting the stream for viewing. 50
The customer is then able to manipulate playback through various trick modes once
playback has commenced. If too many customers are using their RS-DVR at the same
time, the system will generate a “busy signal” and the streaming from the QAM and the
Arroyo servers will be halted and an error message will be displayed suggesting another
time to watch the recorded program. 51
III. TAKE ONE –CABLEVISION I
¶30

The Copyright Act of 1976 allows copyright owners to “reproduce the copyrighted
work in copies” and in the case of audiovisual works, “perform the copyrighted work
publicly.” 52 In order to establish a claim of copyright infringement there are two
requirements: (1) one must have ownership of a valid copyright and (2) unauthorized
copying or a violation of rights given by the Copyright Act. 53 After the court ascertained
that the plaintiffs held valid ownership of the television programming that Cablevision
showed to its customers, it subsequently analyzed the plaintiffs’ claims of whether
Cablevision violated the Copyright Act by making unauthorized copies of the plaintiffs’
programming and by making unauthorized transmissions of the same. 54
A. RS-DVR copies

¶31

The plaintiffs asserted that Cablevision makes unauthorized copies by (1) making a
copy of the program and storing it on the Arroyo servers and (2) temporarily storing the
programs in Cablevision’s buffer memory. 55
1. Arroyo Server Copies

¶32

Cablevision does not deny that copies are made by the RS-DVR, but the ultimate
question is who makes the copies. 56 The plaintiffs likened Cablevision’s RS-DVR to a
service and claimed that Cablevision is the entity who makes the copies. Alternatively,
Cablevision compared the RS-DVR to a VCR or a photocopier and claimed that the
customer does the copying. 57 The court sided with the plaintiffs for multiple reasons. 58
¶33
The court reasoned that the RS-DVR is more like a service than a device and
distinguished the product from a VCR. The court differentiated the RS-DVR from the
VCR, because the RS-DVR cannot be disconnected from the set-top box, connected
elsewhere, and still be able to record programming. 59 The district court noted that the
50

Id. at 615–16.
Id. at 616.
52
17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (4).
53
Byrne v. British Broad. Corp., 132 F. Supp. 2d 229, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
54
Cablevision I, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 612.
55
Id. at 617.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id. In Sony v. Universal, 464 U.S. 417 (1984), the Supreme Court held that time-shifting is “fair use,”
but according to the District Court, the plaintiffs waived any arguments on this basis. The court continued
on to the merits of the plaintiffs’ assertions.
59
Cablevision I, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 618.
51
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RS-DVR, like a VCR, is a machine, but it is linked to a network of different servers. 60
Furthermore, the court distinguished the present case from Sony, for unlike in Sony,
where the only point of contact the customer had with Sony was at the point of sale, the
customer must keep an ongoing relationship with Cablevision in order to use the RSDVR as well. 61 Cablevision not only owns the RS-DVR, but also maintains that the
network is properly working, the court noted. 62 Moreover, Cablevision determines which
programming is available to the customer and how much memory to allocate to each
customer. 63
¶34
Cablevision, however, likened its RS-DVR to the STS-DVR, but the court did not
give the argument much credence. Cablevision pointed out that there have been no prior
cases against cable providers for providing STS-DVRs to their customers, and
comparatively, cable companies should not be liable for copyright infringement by
providing RS-DVRs. 64 The court found this claim unavailing because of the changes
needed in order to allow the RS-DVR to work (i.e. reconfiguring the linear channel
programming, reformatting the stream, routing the stream to the Arroyo servers, etc.). 65
The STS-DVR, however, does not need any reconfiguration, and can record directly to
the hard drive located within the set-top box. 66 The court likened the RS-DVR to more of
a Video-on-Demand service than a STS-DVR, as a Video-on-Demand service stores the
copies at the network for on-demand viewing and is governed by licenses negotiated with
copyright owners. 67
¶35
Cablevision attempted to align itself with cases built on the premise that a company
that makes a service available is not liable unless the company employees do the
copying. 68 The court dismissed Cablevisions claim, and held that since Cablevision
houses the machinery and systems, Cablevision would be “doing” the copying. 69
¶36
Cablevision also relied on Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line
Communication Services, Inc. 70 In Netcom, an Internet Service Provider (ISP) server was
not held liable for copyrighted material that was posted on a computer bulletin board
service because “the court [did] not find a workable theory of infringement 71 that would
hold the entire internet liable for activities that cannot reasonably be deterred.” 72 The
district court disagreed with Cablevision again. It adduced that Cablevision is not like an

60

Id.
Id. at 618–19.
62
Id. at 619.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
See Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Princeton
Univ. Press v. Michigan Documents Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996). In both of these cases,
professors gave copyrighted materials to print shops and the employees then copied the materials without
obtaining permission from the authors of the original work. The print shops were held liable under a theory
that they actively committed the infringement as opposed to customers making prohibited copies on their
own.
69
Cablevision I, 478 F. Supp. 2d. at 620.
70
907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
71
Id. at 1372.
72
Cablevision I, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 621.
61
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ISP, because it has more control over its programming and is not in as passive of a role as
an ISP provider. 73 Ultimately, the district court held that the Arroyo server copies
constitute copyright infringement as a matter of law because the court determined that
Cablevision made the copies of the television programming at the customer’s request. 74
2. Buffer Copies
The Copyright Act states “copies” are:
[M]aterial objects . . . in which a work is fixed by any method now known or
later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated, with directly or with the aid of a machine or device.
The term “copies” includes the material object in which the work is first fixed. 75

Cablevision claimed that the buffer copies are so transient that they could not be fixed
and should be denoted as “otherwise de minimis.” 76 However, the court found this claim
lacking as well. It found two reasons to dismantle the Cablevision’s assertion. First, the
court found that if the buffer copies are able to be reproduced, then the copies could not
be claimed to be “de minimus.” 77 Also, the court viewed the RS-DVR system in the
aggregate (the process in whole) and found that although only a few seconds of television
programming were in the buffer memory at a time, the whole television program could be
copied, and therefore, the system could not be termed as “de minimus.” 78
¶37
The court then analogized the RS-DVR copying to the copies that are made when
software is uploaded into a computer’s Random Access Memory (RAM). The court
relied on precedent that has held that temporary copies of a work in RAM are generally
“fixed” and meet the definition of copies as in the Copyright Act. 79 The district court
then held that the buffer copies infringed on the plaintiffs’ copyrights as well. 80
B. RS-DVR infringes on networks right to display works publicly (transmission)
¶38

The Copyright Act states:
To ‘perform’ a work means to recite render, play, dance, or act it, either directly
or by means of any device or process or, in the case of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, to show its images in any sequence or to make the sounds
accompanying it audible.81

Cablevision did not deny that the recording of a program is a performance, yet the
question is, once again: who is doing the copying? Cablevision asserted that their role
73

Id.
Id.
75
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
76
Cablevision I, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 621.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 517 (9th Cir. 1993); Stenograph L.L.C. v.
Bossard Assoc., Inc., 144 F.3d 96 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (loading of software into RAM is copying).
80
Cablevision I, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 621.
81
17 U.S.C. § 101.
74
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was entirely passive, but the district court rejected it on the notion that the “operation of
an array of computer servers” that cannot be considered passive. 82 Cablevision also
argued that the performance was “fundamentally” private in nature. The Copyright Act
defines a publicly performed work as:
to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work . . .
to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of the
public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same
place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times.83

The court reasoned that a transmission is public “even if the members of the public
receive the transmission at separate places at different times.” 84 It also held that where a
transmission is performed in a commercial relationship, the transmission is made “to the
public”. 85
¶39
The court subsequently enjoined Cablevision from production of the RS-DVR and
from using its system for “(1) copying plaintiff’s copyrighted works and (2) engaging in
public performance[s]” of the same unless it procures licenses from the owner. 86
IV. DIFFERING OPINIONS
¶40

Various entities had differing opinions on the ruling of Cablevision I. This section
is dedicated to eliciting these opinions and their bases.
A. Amici for Cablevision
1. Theory distinction of direct vs. secondary liability

¶41

In their brief, 87 the Center for Democracy and Technology attacks the Cablevision I
decision on its categorization of Cablevision as a direct infringer. 88 The Center for
Democracy and Technology argues Cablevision is not a direct infringer, because
Cablevision does not control the use of recording by the customer. 89 Rather, Cablevision
should at most be liable for secondary liability or contributory infringement, for
Cablevision merely “owns an electronic facility that responds automatically to users’
input.” 90 In Cablevision’s case, it argues that the volition or necessary “nexus”
requirement is lacking. 91 Furthermore, Sony held that a person cannot be secondarily
82

Cablevision I, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 622. Compare with Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd Horne,
Inc. 749 F.2d 154, 159 (3d Cir. 1984) (one who operates the controls “performs” because that activity
results in the sequential showing of the movie’s images accompanied by sound).
83
17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added).
84
Cablevision I, 478 F. Supp. 2d at 623.
85
See On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 777 F. Supp. 787, 790 (N.D. Cal. 1991)
(performance may still be public even though it reaches members of the public at different times and
places).
86
Cablevision I, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 624.
87
Brief for Ctr. for Democracy and Tech. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants (Ctr. for
Democracy Brief), Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008) (No.07-1480).
88
Id. at 6.
89
Id. at 8.
90
Costar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir. 2004).
91
See, e.g., Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 977 (2d Cir. 1980) (to prove
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liable for infringement for technology that is “capable of substantial noninfringing
uses.” 92 Since Cablevision’s video programming is already licensed and legal,
Cablevision should not need another license just because the company provides a system
to allow customers to watch the programming at their leisure. 93 The programming is the
same whether the feed goes to the “customer’s television set, cable box, VCR or home
DVR,” and therefore, Cablevision should not be liable as a direct or secondary
infringer. 94
2. Buffer copies are not copies
¶42

Many professors around the country took a different approach to vindicate
Cablevision’s claims. In their amicus curiae brief, 95 the law professors conclude the
buffer copies that are made through Cablevision’s system are not sufficiently fixed and
argue that momentary reproductions that are “necessarily created” during digital
processes and “which are destroyed almost immediately after they are created” are not
fixed copies. 96
¶43
The law professors disagree with the Cablevision I decision because it does not
distinguish between the time the copies are made in the buffer and it does not follow the
intent of the Copyright Act. 97 A House of Representatives Report explicitly excludes
from the definition of works that are fixed, “evanescent or transient reproductions such as
those projected briefly on a screen, shown electronically on a television . . . or captured
momentarily in the ‘memory’ of a computer.” 98 Moreover, the Copyright Office believes
that the Copyright Act excluded from infringement all reproductions from which
economic value can be derived. 99 Since the district court held that 3 frames of video
lasting less than one tenth of a second 100 satisfied the fixed threshold of the Copyright
Act, 101 most digital devices would lose their use, and the Law Professors argue that the
Copyright did not intend to exclude all copies such as Cablevision’s. 102

infringement the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendants themselves copied his work and that hey
‘improperly appropriated’ his expression); A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 911
(N.D. Cal. 2000) (“[T]o prevail on a contributory infringement claim, a plaintiff must show direct
infringement by a third party.”)
92
Sony v. Universal, 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
93
See Ctr. for Democracy Brief, supra note 87, at 6–8.
94
Id. at 6.
95
Brief for Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants (Law Professors Brief), Cartoon
Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008) (No.07-1480).
96
Id. at 3–4.
97
Id. at 18.
98
H.R. Rep. No 94-1476, at 53 (1976).
99
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DMCA Section 104 Report at 111 (Aug. 2001) (DMCA Report), available
at http://www.copyright.gov/_reports/_studies/_dmca/sec- 104-_report-_ bol-_1.pdf.
100
Law Professors Brief, supra note 95 at 5; Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys.
Corp. (Cablevision I), 478 F. Supp. 2d 607, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
101
Law Professors Brief, supra note 95 at 7 (“The material object is ‘sufficiently permanent or stable’ so
that it can be perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated ‘for a period of more than transitory
duration.’ 17 U.S.C. § 101.”).
102
See Law Professors Brief, supra note 95 at 17–26.

333

NOR THWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLEC TUAL PROPER TY

[2010

3. Policy arguments
¶44

The implications of the decision of Cablevision I would be drastic. The Center for
Democracy and Technology claims that the innovation of remote servers 103 “reduces the
need for local storage devices and offers greater security and better disaster recovery.” 104
If Cablevision I is affirmed, the Center believes that this would curb beneficial
innovation, like Cablevision’s RS-DVR system, by making products too expensive due to
increased licensing fees or make licensing software an “impractical impossibility.” 105
The Copyright Act did not intend to chill technological advances.
B. Amici against Cablevision
1. Progress and Freedom Foundation

The Progress & Freedom Foundation (PFF) argues in its brief 106 that Cablevision
should not escape liability as a direct infringer because they assert a substantial amount of
control over the RS-DVR. 107 Cablevision “selects the content at issue as well as
maintains physical control of the programming and the copies throughout,” 108 and PFF
argues that Cablevision should not get to hide behind the customer. 109 Cablevision’s
control of the material, PFF argues, “take this case well out of the realm of cases
involving photocopy machines, the VCR , and the Internet . . . it simply restore[s] the
incentives of both sides to negotiate further licenses.” 110
¶46
PFF further argues that the need for licensure when new technologies develop does
not leave one side winning and the other side losing. 111 The organization alludes that
innovation and production of material could be halted if the District Court’s decision
were to be overturned. 112 PFF claims the Cablevision I decision keeps Cablevision’s
incentive to license quality material and also asserts the providers of quality material will
be compensated and incentivized to continue to produce material. 113 Therefore, the
holding in Cablevision I does not run contrary to the intent of the Copyright Act.

¶45

V. TAKE TWO
¶47

The Court of Appeals for the Second District reviewed the district court on three
matters: (1) whether the copyrighted materials were “fixed” as defined under the

103

Examples include Apple’s .mac, which allows consumer to back up the contents of the computers,
and Google Docs, which allows for sharing of documents and information.
104
Ctr. for Democracy Brief, supra note 87, at 23.
105
Id. at 25.
106
Brief for Progress & Freedom Foundation as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees (PFF Brief),
Cartoon Network LLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121(2d Cir. 2008) (No.07-1480).
107
See id. at 4–8.
108
Id. at 4.
109
Id. at 4–5.
110
Id. at 3.
111
See id. at 8–9.
112
Id. at 9–10 (“In a nutshell, content must be protected, or it will not be produced.”).
113
Id.
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Copyright Act, (2) whether Cablevision made the copies, and (3) whether the
transmissions were performed “to the public.” 114
A. Court of Appeals’ Take on MAI
¶48

The court first addressed whether Cablevision makes the copies. It looked at the
Copyright Act and determined that the language required satisfaction of two components:
(1) the work must be embodied in a medium (embodiment requirement) and (2) it must
remain embodied “for a period of more than transitory duration” (the duration
requirement). 115 If both components are not met, then no copy has been made.
¶49
The court held that the district court’s reliance on MAI was erroneous because the
case did not discuss the duration requirement, and thus, the case was not applicable to the
present situation. 116 Also, the court factually distinguished the present case from MAI
because it assumed that the program was embodied in the RAM for “at least several
minutes” whereas the television programs are held in the buffer stream for 1.2 seconds. 117
Ultimately, the appellate court interpreted MAI to hold that loading a copyrighted
program can, but does not always, result in a copying of that program. 118 Similarly, the
court found the district court’s strict reliance on a Copyright Office’s report was
improper 119 as such a report is not binding and only persuasive authority. The appellate
court found support in another MAI case, Advanced Computer Services of Michigan, Inc.
v. MAI Systems Corporation, 120 which dealt with a similar matter. In Advanced
Computer Services, the court stated a program may be too ephemeral if a computer had
been shut down “within seconds or fractions of a second” after loading the copyrighted
program. 121 Therefore, the court only gave the Copyright Office’s report persuasive
power. 122 Since there wasn’t any precedent indicating that there was a duration
requirement within the definition of “fixed,” the court turned to evaluating the claims that
the copyrighted material was “fixed” and therefore a copy within the meaning of the
Copyright Act. 123
¶50
Cablevision did not dispute that the works were embodied in the buffer, and the
court found it so.124 Relying on the notion that the data remains in the buffer for no
longer than 1.2 seconds, the court factually distinguished this case from MAI and

114

See Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision II), 536 F.3d 121, 126 (2d Cir. 2008).
Id. at 127.
116
Id. (“[I]n general, those cases conclude that an alleged copy is fixed without addressing the duration
requirement.”); id. at 128 (“This omission suggests that the parties did not litigate the significance of the
‘transitory duration’ language, and the court therefore had no occasion to address it.”).
117
Id. at 129.
118
Id. at 128.
119
DMCA Report, supra note 99 (unless a reproduction manifests itself so fleetingly that it cannot be
copied, perceived or communicated).
120
845 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Va. 1994)
121
Id. at 363.
122
Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 129.
123
Id.
124
See id. at 129 (when only a part of a work is in a buffer the result may be different, but when the
whole work is placed second by second in the buffer, the work has been embodied in the buffer).
115
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determined that the duration requirement was not met, and thus no copy was made. 125
The court did not rule on the question of whether the data would be “de minimus.”
B. Court of appeals take on the playback copies
¶51

In answering the question of who makes the playback copies, the present court
dissected the district court’s analysis of the Netcom case. The district court limited this
decision to the realm of the internet; however, the appellate court expanded its holding to
apply in this instance, also relying on a Fourth Circuit concurrence. 126 The district court
did not believe that Cablevision was sufficiently distinguishable from a “company that
merely makes photocopiers available to the public or a VCR user.” 127 The court validated
this conclusion by stating there was a difference between “making a request to a human
employee who then volitionally operates the copying system . . . and issuing a command
directly to a system which automatically obeys commands.” 128 Rather, the appellate
court likened Cablevision to a copy store that charges its customers to make copies on its
premises. 129
¶52
The Second Circuit also disagreed with the district court’s analysis regarding the
discretion of programming by Cablevision. The court reasoned that Cablevision is more
a conduit than a volitional decision maker. 130 Cablevision did not have any power over
which programming would be shown on its channels; only the television networks had
that discretion. Cablevision merely provides the opportunity for customers to watch.
Using this analysis along with Sony, 131 the court reasoned that Cablevision should be
liable on a theory of contributory liability, not direct liability.
¶53
Furthermore, to draw the distinction between direct and contributory liability, the
appellate court contrasted the Patent Act and the Copyright Act. The Patent Act grants
direct liability for the one committing the infringement and for the one who induces the
infringement 132 while, “[t]he Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable for
infringement committed by another.” 133 Since Congress wrote this in the Patent Act and
not in the Copyright Act, the court reasoned Congress did not intend direct liability for

125

Id. at 130 (“While our inquiry is necessarily fact-specific, and other factors not present here may alter
the duration analysis significantly these facts strongly suggest that the works in this case are embodied in
the buffer ‘for only a ‘transitory’ period, thus failing the duration requirement.”).
126
Religious Tech. Ctr. V. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Serv., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1370 (N.D. Cal.
1995) (direct liability should involve some form of volition or causation which is lacking where
defendant’s system is used to create the copy); see also CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544,
551 (4th Cir. 2004) (The court found it “a particularly rational interpretation of § 106” rather than a special
purpose rule applicable only to ISPs.).
127
Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 131.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
See id. at 132.
131
Sony v. Universal, 464 U.S. 417, 418 (1984) (it is just to impose liability on a party in a “position to
control” the infringing uses of another, but as a contributory, not direct, infringer).
132
35 U.S.C § 271(a)–(b) (2006) (gives direct liability to the person who “actively induces infringement
of a patent and the person who induces that infringement).
133
Sony, 464 U.S. at 434.
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persons who induce a copyright infringement. 134 Subsequently, the court held that
Cablevision is not directly liable for the playback copies. 135
C. Court of Appeals take on transmission of Playback
¶54

Lastly, the court addressed the theory that Cablevision infringes on the right to
perform a work publicly. The court looked at the definitional section of the Copyright
Act to determine what “publicly” means; there are two definitions under the Act, and the
court determined that the first definition did not apply to Cablevision. The second part of
the definition defines to perform a work publicly as:
“to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to a
place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process,
whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance of
display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or
at different times.” 136

Although the statute does not define the term “performance” or “to the public,” the court
found that a transmission of a performance is itself a performance, which was also
supported by legislative history. 137
¶55
The court then turned to determining who is “capable of receiving” a particular
transmission or performance. Cablevision argued that the performance is not “to the
public” because the customer is the only one capable of receiving the playback copy, and
the appellate court agreed. 138 Looking to the Copyright Act, the court criticized their
reading of the Act because its reasoning would make every performance “to the public”
and render the “to the public” language superfluous. 139 Undoubtedly, the Copyright Act
envisioned transmissions or performances that were not “to the public.” 140
¶56
The plaintiffs asserted that to perform a work publicly, Congress meant “transmit
. . . the ‘original performance’ . . . to the public” and thus have to determine the audience
of any transmission of the same underlying “original” performance, not just the
performance of the unique performance. 141 The court rejected this theory, and limited the
determination of the audience to the transmission that occurred and not to the intended
audience of the ‘original’ performance because it was not germane with prior
interpretations of the transmit clause. 142 Relying on NFL and limiting this holding to only
134

Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 133.
Id.
136
17 U.S.C. § 101.
137
Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 134 (“The fact the statues says ‘capable of receiving a performance’
instead of ‘capable of receiving the transmission,’ underscores the fact that a transmission of a performance
is itself a performance.); see also Buck v. Jewell–La Salle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 197–98 (1931).
138
See Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 135–137.
139
Id. at 135–136 (“We cannot reconcile the district court’s approach with the language of the transmit
clause. That clause speaks of people capable of receiving a particular ‘transmission’ or ‘performance’, and
not the potential audience of a particular ‘work.’ Doubtless the potential audience for every copyrighted
audiovisual work is the general public.”).
140
Id. at 136.
141
Id.
142
In National Football League v. Primetime 24 Joint Venture (NFL), 211 F.3d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 2000),
the same court held, “the most logical interpretation . . . is to hold that a public performance or display
135
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transmissions whose final link was “to the public,” the court held that NFL was
inapplicable to the current case. 143 Similarly, the Court distinguished the district court’s
reliance on Redd Horne 144 and On Command 145 because it held Cablevision’s
performance is not by definition “to the public.”
¶57
Ultimately, the court reversed and remanded all of district Court’s holdings and
absolved Cablevision of any liability theories asserted by the plaintiffs.
VI. THE END GAME
¶58

In order to ascertain what the Supreme Court will do, I will need to give a
background of previous decisions by the Supreme Court on the topic.
A. Sony v. Universal

In Sony v. Universal, 146 Sony was sued by Universal and Disney for its sale of
Video Tape Recorders (VTRs) that were able to record television programs that were
broadcast on public airwaves. Universal claimed this recording infringed on the
respondent’s copyrights, and thus, Sony should be liable for the infringement.
¶60
The court held that the sale of VTRs to the general public does not constitute
contributory infringement of the copyrights. 147 The holding was supported by various
theories. The Court first reasoned that any individual may reproduce a copyrighted work
for a “fair use” and the copyright owner does not possess the exclusive right to such a
use. 148 The court also reasoned that the sale of the VTRs does not constitute contributory
infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate purposes or is merely capable of
substantial non-infringing uses. 149 Furthermore, the court found that any time-shifting
that was completed would cause minimal harm, and thus should qualify for legitimate fair
use. 150

¶59

B. What the Supreme Court should decide?
¶61

Before I begin my analysis, I want to take a step back and think about one question:
What is RS-DVR and what is its primary purpose?
¶62
The RS-DVR is a DVR that records television programming off-site. All the
essential technological processes and equipment needed to store the programming off-site
is quite similar to the processes needed for the DVR to store programming locally. The

includes each step in the process by which a protected work wends its way to its audience.” The court
limited this holding to only performances that resulted in transmissions to the public.
143
Cablevision II, 536 F.3d at 137.
144
The court distinguished Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d 154 (3d Cir.
1984), because the contested performance was from one copy played multiple times to different people.
145
The court distinguished On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, 777 F. Supp.
787, 790 (N.D. Cal. 1991), because it ruled any commercial transmission is a transmission “to the public”
and the court invalidated this claim through earlier reasoning.
146
464 U.S. 417 (1984).
147
Id. at 456.
148
Id. at 433.
149
Id. at 440.
150
Id. at 496.
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only difference between the DVR and the RS-DVR is the location of the storage of the
programming. One can imagine the intricate network of equipment and processes needed
for the RS-DVR to function as a DVR with a long universal serial bus (USB) cord to the
head-end facility, or as an extension of the DVR itself. Therefore, inherent in this
premise, if the RS-DVR violates the Copyright Act, then the DVR also violates the
Copyright Act.
¶63
Since the RS-DVR can be considered one big machine or a DVR with a long USB
cord, it can be used in the same analysis as the VTR in Sony. In Sony, the VTRs
completed much the same function as the RS-DVR; the VTR recorded television
programs, and created the ability for a customer to watch the show at its convenience. As
reasoned by the Sony Court, the television networks benefit from the delayed viewing by
the consumer, 151 and the same benefit should be obtained by the RS-DVR. Essentially,
the RS-DVR only allows consumers the opportunity to watch television episodes at their
leisure and the Supreme Court should deem this fair use.
¶64
As in Sony where the Court held that a maker of equipment that can be used to
infringe copyrights cannot be held as a direct or contributory infringer if the equipment
may be widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes or substantial “fair
use[s],”152 the RS-DVR provides the customer the opportunity to view programming
which the customer has already paid. The networks did not derive any further revenue
from the copies made by the VTRs in Sony, and the networks should not derive any
further revenue from a newer form of technology that completes the same task.
¶65
To bring this article full circle to the fixed medium and copy debate between the
district court and the Second Circuit, their reliance on whether buffer copies are made,
the playback copies violate the Copyright Act, and if the performance is “to the public” is
misplaced. Their analysis could have simply been shortened had the courts took a step
back to look at the bigger picture. After the courts verified that the copies that were made
by the RS-DVR ensured that only the customer could watch his own recordings, the next
step should have moved to Sony analysis. Yes, a copy is made—even with the VTR in
the early 1980s—but like the Second Circuit noted, not all copies violate the Copyright
Act. 153 Furthermore, all performances of copyrighted works are not “to the public.” 154
Using this analysis, the Supreme Court should follow their Sony precedent, hold that the
RS-DVR has substantial fair uses, and find Cablevision not directly liable for any
infringement caused by the RS-DVR.

151

Id. at 443–47.
See id. at 435–42.
153
Id. at 443–57.
154
See Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision II), 536 F.3d 121, 135–36 (2d Cir.
2008).
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